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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HOWARD B. CAHOON, ') 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
v. \ 
I 
ROBERT P. PELTON, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8976 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Appellant respectfully petitions for a rehearing 
herein on the grounds discussed in detail hereinafter. In 
addition to the detailed treatment of points as set forth 
herein and in Appellant's other briefs, one general observa-
tion is made. 
The appeal involves several questions. of first impres-
sion, and authorities from other jurisdictions have been 
cited by Appellant in support of Appellant's contentions 
thereon. Despite the novelty of these questions and the 
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authorities cited in support of Appellant's position, the 
Court has brushed these points off with the statement that 
they are without merit and will not be discussed in detail. 
Appellant submits that the said points are valid, that Ap-
pellant's contentions thereon are correct, and that said 
points deserve full and detailed treatment by the Court. 
Appellant has the impression that he has failed to direct 
the Court's full attention to these points and that they rep-
resent a part of the briefs which has not received full and 
critical treatment. Appellant urges the Court to reconsider 
the said points, giving to each such point the same full and 
careful consideration which has distinguished the Court's 
decisions in the past. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE B E T WE EN 
PLAINTIFF AND MRS. SHAW PROVIDES NO 
BASIS FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
DEFENDANT. 
POINT II. 
AN ACTION FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION 
IS NOT PERMITTED UNDER THE UTAH 
LAW. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES AND IN PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
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WEALTH TO BE INTRODUCED ON THE IS-
SUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The majority opinion states the law which we believe 
is applicable to the instant case. It is as follows : 
"California, the same as Utah, and all other 
states, holds that a second marriage is void if at 
any time one of the parties has an undivorced hus-
band or wife living. Generally, the laws of the state 
where the marriage is consummated determine its 
validity." 
The only question properly before the Court respecting 
this point is whether or not the marriage performed be-
tween Mrs. Shaw and Howard B. Cahoon was a valid mar-
riage at the time it was performed. We believe that the 
Utah Supreme Court in Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 
153 P. 2d 262; Sanders v. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 
372, 230 Pac. 1026; and In Re Dalton's Estate, 109 Utah 
503, 167 P. 2d 690, holds it was not. Justice Henriod in a 
dissenting opinion in the instant case says it was not. Jus-
tice Wade and Keller say it was a valid marriage for all 
purposes. Justice Crockett says it was a valid marriage in 
the instant case but may not have been a valid marriage if 
the equities had been different. Justice McDonough concurs 
in the result. Whether or not he concurred with the two 
majority Justices on the issue of the validity of the Cahoon 
marriage is, of course, impossible to determine. We thus 
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have an opinion which may hold that marriages performed 
in Utah involving a party who has not been finally divorced 
in California may or may not be valid depending on the 
equities of each case. The opinion of Justice Crockett opens 
the question as to whether a common law marriage may, 
in Utah, provide the basis for an action for alienation of 
affections and criminal conversation. Wouldn't a common 
law marriage confer a "color of title?" 
We submit that a determination of the validity of a 
marriage depending on each individual case violates the 
constitution of the State of Utah which in Article I, Sec-
tion 24 provides : 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
Certainly, lawyers advising their clients on the question 
of marriage should be able to give them a definite opinion 
as to their status at the time of the marriage. They should 
not be required to advise them that they are married or not 
married depending on what occurs in the future. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT COMThiiTTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 (R. 124-125). 
This instruction without question inconsistently ad-
vises the jury. In one part of the instruction the jurors 
were correctly told that plaintiff could not recover if his 
wife's affections were alienated in Nevada. Near the end 
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of the instruction, the jurors were told that plaintiff could 
recover if "Robert P. Pelton was not in Nevada at the time 
he caused her to lose her affections for Howard B. Cahoon." 
This, of course, was wrong. The Court did not choose to 
discuss this error, apparently concluding it was not preju-
dicial. 
POINT VI. 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM BRINGING 
AN ACTION ARISING OUT OF HIS MAR-
RIAGE BY REASON OF A PRIOR DIVORCE 
OBTAINED BY MRS. SHAW BASED ON HIS 
MISCONDUCT. 
The question raised in Point VI had previously been 
decided by a three to two court in Sadlier v. Knapton, 5 
Utah 2d 33, 296 P. 2d 278. Inasmuch as the Court deciding 
the instant case consisted of a new member, we felt the 
Court might want to reconsider the effect of the Sadlier 
case. It apparently did not care to do so and we have noth-
ing to add to the argument made in Point VI of the brief 
of appellant on file herein. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 22 (R. 114) 
AND IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 13 (R. 
126) AND NO. 15 (R. 128). 
Point VII, we believe, raised an important question 
which merited some discussion. The effect of the instruc-
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tion was to permit the jury to award damages to the plain-
tiff beyond the time of divorce which his wife obtained 
from him on December 4, 1956 in the Nevada courts. This 
marriage terminated plaintiff's legal right to any services 
from his former wife. The jury was permitted to award 
damages to him for this right which had been forfeited. 
This goes far beyond the Sadlier case supra and is contrary 
to the cases cited by the appellant in his brief on file herein. 
The only law which we have found which in any way sup-
ports the Court's position is in dicta contained in the 
Oldroyd case. In Beach v. Brown, 20 Wash. 266,43 L. R. A. 
114, 72 Am. St. Rep. 98, 5 Pac. 46, the Court categorically 
stated : "Of course, the damages could not be calculated 
after the time when the decree of divorce was obtained." 
This Court without discussing any of the cases cited 
by the appellant in support of the proposition stated in 
Point VII simply dismisses the question by stating that the 
point is without merit and will not be discussed in detail. 
POINT VIII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE 
LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLES, INSTRUCTION 
NO. 7, FIRST TRIAL, (R. 21), INSTRUCTION 
NO. 15, SECOND TRIAL (R. 128) AND IN PER-
MITTING COUNSEL TO ARGUE FROM THE 
SAME TO THE JURY. 
We cited Johnson v. Richards, 50 Idaho 150, 294 Pac. 
507, wherein the Idaho court explicitly held that it was 
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error to instruct a jury on life expectancy tables in a case 
involving alienation of affections. We thought the case was 
directly in point and particularly applicable because counsel 
at great length, as the records will show, argued from the 
life expectancy tables. 
This is a case of first impression on the question of life 
expectancy tables in alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation cases in the State of Utah. We sincerely sub-
mit that the point should have been reviewed by the court, 
particularly inasmuch as these recent alienation of affec-
tions cases are paving the way for numerous more of the 
same kind which will be filed in the courts in the near 
future. 
We believe that the point is especially important, be-
cause counsel for the plaintiff especially emphasized the 
life expectancy feature in his argument to the jury. We 
cited cases from several jurisdictions wherein this practice, 
aside from the question of admissibility of life expectancy 
tables, was held error. The court considered none of these 
cases. 
POINT IX. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ER-
ROR IN THE SECOND TRIAL IN ALLOWING 
AN OFFSET OF $17,000.00 AGAINST ONLY 
THE ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS JUDG-
MENT. 
In urging a reconsideration of Point IX, we can only 
add to what has already been stated in Appellant's Brief 
that the jury never intended the result achieved by the trial 
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court, i. e., allowing the offset of $17,000.00 to be applied 
only against the alienation of affections judgment. The 
jurors obviously intended the $17,000.00 to be applied 
against the whole judgment. That this was their intention 
was recognized by the trial Judge in his Memorandum De-
cision. He nevertheless confined the offset to the alienation 
of affections action, thus reducing the jurors' intended set 
off by $13,500.00 We submit that by doing so the trial 
court reached a result which was radically different than 
the result intended by the jury. 
POINT X. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN PERMITTING COUNSEL FOR THE 
DEFENDANT TO READ TO THE JURORS 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FROM DEPOSI-
TIONS IN WHICH THE WITNESSES CLAIMED 
THEIR PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIM-
INATION. 
POINT XI. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NOS. 24, 25 AND 
26. 
The foregoing points are related and are therefore dis-
cussed together herein. 
We believe that the legal questions raised under Points 
X and XI are of great constitutional importance and of 
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first impression in this State. Whether or not a claim of 
privilege is admissible as a basis for an inference is the 
subject of an annotation in 24 A. L. R. 2d 896. There the 
editors note that the courts which have decided the question 
uniformly hold that "refusal alone cannot be made a basis 
of any inference by the jury." 
The editors further note "No case has been found ex-
pressing a view opposite to the general rule as stated above." 
The Utah trial court held contra to the general rule 
stated herein. We sincerely submit that the trial court 
should be reviewed on the question. It is very frustrating 
and discouraging to cite cases declaring a unanimous view-
point contrary to what a trial court has held and on a very 
material and current constitutional question and have the 
reviewing court review in silence. We submit that the ques-
tion merits a decision. 
POINT XII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 20. 
Perhaps the most important "fact" defense the defen-
dant had in the instant case was the conduct of the plain-
tiff's wife in going out with other men; in fact, it was the 
only fact defense offered. Consistent with this defense, 
defendant requested the Court to instruct the jury with 
reference to the law applicable thereto which is that the 
jurors may and should consider this fact in mitigation of 
damages. The Court did not so instruct; in fact, the Court 
eliminated a consideration of the issue by advising the 
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jurors in the Court's Instruction No. 11 that they were in 
effect to disregard such matters. Certainly, this Court has 
held often enough that each party is entitled to have a jury 
instructed on its theory of the case. In the instant case, 
the jury was not so instructed. 
POINT XIII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 12. 
POINT XIV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 13. 
What has been said with reference to Point VII is 
equally applicable to Points XIII and XIV. The instructions 
excepted to enabled the jurors to find damages for mental 
anguish and distress, past, present and future and for loss 
of companionship, aid, society and services not only before 
plaintiff obtained a divorce from his wife but in perpetuity 
thereafter so long as plaintiff or his wife should live. We 
believe that no Appellate Court would write an opinion in 
which it would specifically hold that such damages are al-
lowable even after a wife has obtained a divorce from her 
husband because of extreme mental cruelty. The trial court 
so held, and this Court by its. silence has approved. Of 
course, it goes without saying that this was material and 
highly prejudicial to defendant. 
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POINT XV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT THE VERDICT WAS GROSSLY EXCES-
SIVE AND UNWARRANTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
Counsel cannot add anything to what has already been 
stated in the Brief of Appellant on file herein with refer-
ence to point XV. We sincerely submit that the only way 
the Court can review this point properly is by reviewing 
the entire trial transcript. 
CONCLUSION 
We believe that the case before this Court has raised 
important and material questions which have not been 
decided by the Court. Some of these questions are of first 
impression, such as the admissibility of life expectancy 
tables in alienation of affections and criminal conversation; 
the right to damages for loss of services, mental anguish 
and companionship in the future when it affirmatively 
appears that the marriage has been terminated through the 
fault of the plaintiff; the admissibility of a claim of privi-
lege, and whether or not a claim of privilege may be con--
sidered by the jurors as in inference of guilt, first as to the 
defendant, and second as to a witness who is not a defen-
dant. The Court also was asked to review the trial court's 
failure to instruct the jury on defendant's theory of the 
case. Some of these questions are of constitutional im-
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portance. We feel that all of them were material, and that 
the error committed was prejudicial. 
Finally, a judgment of this amount is disastrous to any 
individual. Mr. Pelton will suffer irreparably and far 
beyond any damage done to the plaintiff. We earnestly and 
sincerely submit that the Court should reconsider its ruling, 
particularly with reference to the last eleven points about 
which the Court re·mained silent in its opinion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Leonard J. Lewis, 
Clifford L. Ashton, 
Counsel for Appellant 
and Defendant. 
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